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I. INTRODUCTION
A premise of protecting intellectual property rights is to encourage
innovation by granting the creator of an idea a monopoly in a market so the
creator may reap enough benefits to recoup the costs of innovation.' This
protection encourages innovation because "[p]rivate producers have an incentive
to invest in innovation only if they receive an appropriate return."
2 This system
was conceived by the founding fathers and is codified in the Constitution.
3
Intellectual property rights permit holders to go after others who try to utilize
the underlying intellectual property; this protection creates a financial incentive
to create because it allows for protection in the market. 4
Similar to incentivizing innovation via intellectual property rights,
governments use taxes to incentivize certain behaviors.5 Intellectual property has
historically been a revenue-generating taxable asset.6 Prior to the passage of the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), patents and unpatented inventions
created by individual taxpayers were categorized as capital assets and were
therefore generally subject to significantly lower tax rates than ordinary income.7
The revision of the code occurs in the Tax Cut and Jobs Act, section 26 U.S.C.
( 1221:
(a) . . . '[C]apital asset' means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include-
1 Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual
Property, 5.1 J. EcON. PERSP., 1, 5 (1991).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 8; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4 Besen & Raskind, supranote 1, at 3-4 ("[Mainstream of the economics profession has
generally argued that economic efficiency requires government support for innovative and
creative activity, but a dissenting tradition has argued that government action of any kind,
including the awarding of copyrights and patents, is unnecessary to stimulate such activity."
(citations omitted)). There is legitimate debate whether the protection of intellectual property
rights is necessary to encourage innovation, this note proceeds under the analysis of the
current system-protecting recognized rights to intellectual property.
5 J.D. Foster, Incentiver Influence Behavior, and Tax Rates Certainly Influence Incentives, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (Sep. 23, 2016), https://www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-
fold/incentives-influence-behavior-and-tax-rates-certainly-influence-incentives
6 Michael Rosen, Tax reform's impact on intellectualproperty, AEIDEAS (Jan. 31, 2018, 6:00 AM),
http://www.aeiorg/publication/tax-reforms-impact-on-intellectual-property/.
7 Td
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(3) a patent, invention, model or design (whether or not
patented), a secret formula or process, a copyright, a literary,
musical, artistic competition, a letter or memorandum, or
similar property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such
property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar
property, a taxpayer for whom such property was
prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property
is determined, for purposes of determining gain from a
sale or exchange, in whole or part by reference to the
basis such property in the hands of a taxpayer ... 8
A Joint Explanatory Statement of the TCJA explained this change was
intended for any "gains or losses from the sale or exchange of a patent, invention,
model or design (whether or not patented) ... [to] not receive capital gain
treatment," meaning this type of income will be categorized as ordinary income.9
This change "applies to dispositions after December 31, 2017."1o Additionally,
this note focuses on the effects this policy change will have on the sale of patents,
although the current U.S. Code changes the status of all intellectual property
rights. Patents were chosen as the primary focus because they present the most
straight forward and new policy change.
Going forward, this means that income generated from the sale of intellectual
property assets are subject to the corporate income tax rate when the rights are
held by a corporation, and income generated when an intellectual property asset
is sold by an individual is subject to the individual income tax rate. "Overall, it
appears that the new law poorly treats owners of and investors in self-created
[intellectual property].""
Many companies currently based their intellectual property rights in countries
such as Ireland. 12 The United States policy change comes at a time when
countries like Ireland "may be phasing out popular aspects of its favorable tax
8 26 U.S.C. 1221(2017) (emphasis added).
9 joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. 1 (2017), at 259.
10 Id. at 260.
11 James M. McCarten, Patent Turmoil: Self-createdlP after Tax Reform, BURR ALERT (Jan. 2018)
(alteration in original) http://www.burr.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01 /ALERT_
Patent-TurmoilSelf-Created-IP-After-Tax-ReformMcCarten.pdf.
12 Rosen, supra note 6.
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treatment." 13 Understanding how the U.S. tax code treats intellectual property
rights as compared to other nations can be helpful in explaining the possible
incentives created by the current change in U.S. policy.
There are portions of the tax code which contradict the assertion that
intellectual property assets are no longer capital assets. However, this note
proceeds on the assumption that the code is interpreted consistently with the
Joint Explanatory Statement's stated purpose. Scholarly statutory interpretation
that suggests this is the appropriate reading of the language. 14 Prior to the passage
of the TCJA, 26 U.S.C. 5 1221 excluded copyrights and "literary, musical or
artistic composition" from capital asset treatment.15 The recent revision added
patents and other inventions to the list of items excluded from capital asset
treatment. 16 The Conference Committee Report reflected the intention of the
amendment to exclude the "gains or losses from the sale or exchange of a patent"
from capital gain treatment.17
The sale of an intellectual property asset could be categorized as a capital asset
under 26 U.S.C. § 1235, despite the revision of 5 1221, since Congress left in
place contradicting language in 5 1235:18
A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of property
consisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided
interest therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any
holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than 1 year.19
This direct contradiction was addressed by Professor Polito, one of the few
scholars that have analyzed this contradiction. After analyzing the congressional
intent and various methods of statutory interpretation, Professor Polito
determined that the statutes' provided intent will either stand in court or the
relevant statutes will be revised to no longer categorize intellectual property
assets as capital assets. 20
14 See Anthony Polito, Did Congress Goof? TCJA and the Taxation of Self-Created Patents and
Inventions, TAX NOTEs 51, 5 (forthcoming) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractrid=3223822. When Congress revised 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(3), they failed to repeal to
special carve out for self-created intellectual property rights in § 1235 that specifically granted
capital gain treatment of self-created patents and inventions.
1s Id. at 51 (citing U.S.C. § 1221 (a)(3)).
16 Id. at 52.
17 Id at 52-53. (Citing H.R. REP. No. 115-466, at 413-14 (2017) (Conf. Rep.), available on
Westlaw at 2017 WL 6406640 (Leg. Hist.).)
18 WILLIAM BYRNES, TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 6.06 (Matthew Bender
2018).
19 26 U.S.C. 5§1235 (2018).
20 Polito, supra note 15
[Vol. 26:2332
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II. BACKGROUND
A. TCJA'S TREATMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS IN LINE WITH
UNDERLYING TAX POLICIES
On its face, no longer categorizing self-created intellectual property as a
capital asset brings federal tax policy more in line with principles of income tax-
"the creator of [intellectual property] is actually being compensated for labor"
which should be taxed at typical income rates.21 But along with bringing this tax
provision in line with the income tax policy also comes the risk of the tax
distorting the purpose of protecting intellectual property rights-to provide
inventors the ability to economically recover the costs of innovation. 22 This
change could hinder small inventors' financial motivation for inventing 23 because
"creators of intellectual property can often maximize monetary return from its
exploitation through sale... to others." 24 The purpose of protecting intellectual
property rights is stimulating innovation; while some people will undoubtedly
innovate regardless, the promise of some sort of monetary reward helps to spur -
innovation among those who might not otherwise do so. 25
Additionally, the revision of 26 U.S.C. § 1221 raises the question of whether
the new tax regime strikes the appropriate balance required for the protection to
encourage innovation-financial incentive. The new provision is unlikely to
affect the secondary patent market because this provision only applies to the sale
of a patent from the original holder.26
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS ARE EASILY MANIPULATABLE FOR TAX
PURPOSES
Intangible assets such as intellectual property constitute a major asset for
multinational firms. 27 The unique aspect of intangible assets is that they do "not
have a clear geographical location." 28 The intangible nature of intellectual
21 Id. at 53. *Be sure to change this based on what you put in for FN 22*
22 Besen & Raskind, supra note 1, at 5.
2 Malathi Nayak, Tax Bill Would Eminate Capital Gains Treatment for IPSales, BNA (Nov. 3,
2017), https://www.bna.com/tax-bill-eliniinate-n73014471731/. See also, Schechner, supra,
note 12 ("it appears that the new law poorly treats owners of and investors in self-created
[intellectual property].").
24 BYRNEs, supra note 18 6.01.
2 Christopher M. Kalanje, Role ofIntellectual Propery in Innovation and New Product Development,
WIPO (last visited April 4, 2019) https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/
documents/pdf/ipjinnovation-development.pdf.
26 Kalanje, supra note 27.
27 Lisa Evers, Helen Miller, and Christoph Spengel, Intellctualpropertj box regimes: efective tax
rates and tax poliy considerations, 22 INT. TAx PUB. FIN. 502, 503 (2014).
28 Id.
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property creates flexibility that can be manipulated by firms to reduce their tax
obligations. 29 "[A]bout half of the income shifted from high-tax to low-tax
countries by US manufacturing firms can be accounted for by income from
intangibles linked to research & development." 30 This profit shifting
manipulation "leads to significant revenue losses for high-tax countries."31 These
mechanisms, which businesses use to shift profits in a way that erodes a country's
tax base, are referred to as "base erosion and profit shifting" (BEPS) actions. 32
Profit shifting mechanisms such as this cost the United States billions of dollars
of tax revenue annually. 33
Firms generally do locate their intellectual property in the lowest tax rate
countries. 34 "A firm can register legal ownership of a patent in a subsidiary that
is located in a country different to the firm's headquarters, different to the
location where the underlying technology was created and different to the
location where the intellectual property will be applied." 35 But, tax rates are not
the only consideration firms look at when determining where to base their
intellectual property. Firms also consider the strength of the protections in a
given country in addition to the country's market size.
36 Firms also may simply
choose to locate their intellectual property in the same country as their research
and development because of the convenience of co-location. 37
C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAX BOX REGIMES
In response to the tax incentives that were shifting revenue, some countries
developed "Intellectual Property Box" tax regimes which reduced the corporate
"tax levied on the income derived from patents and in some cases from other
29 Id
3 Id.
31 Id.
32 JANE G. GRAvELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R44900, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (BEPS): OECD TAx PROPOSALS (2017) (quoting Base erosion andprofitshfting, OECD
(last visited April 4, 2019), http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/) (BEPS are "tax-avoidance
strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-
tax locations."). .
33 Id
34 Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller, and Martin O'Connell, Ownershi of Intellectual Property and
Corporate Taxation, 112 J. OF P. EcON. 12 (2014).
3s Id. at 12; see Schechner, supra, note 12 ("The Double Irish is a structure that allows
companies to reduce taxable income by setting up two entities-an Irish-registered parent
based in a tax haven such as Bermuda that houses a company's foreign [intellectual property]
rights, and an Irish subsidiary, which licenses the [intellectual property] and pays royalties in
turn. Since Ireland doesn't tax the royalties paid, the company's tax bill is effectively
reduced.").
36 Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller, and Martin O'Connell, Ownership of Intellectual Propery and
Corporate Taxation, 112 J. OF P. ECON. 12 (2014).
37 Id
[Vol. 26:2334
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forms of intellectual property." 38 As of 2014, "[t]welve European countries [...]
offer[ed] a reduced rate of corporate tax on the income derived from parents
and, in many cases, income from other forms of intellectual property." 39 These
rates range from 0% to 15.5%.4 Most recently, the United Kingdom has been
luring "U.S. companies with its 10 percent patent box rate." 41 These "boxes"
were introduced to incentivize investment, attract high-skilled jobs, and to
increase tax revenue. 42 "The importance of intangible assets for multinational
companies cannot be overestimated." 43 Because of this importance, and the
impact the location on a community that the presence of a multinational
company can have, it is unsurprising that the majority of developed states have
used intellectual property box tax incentives to lure multinational corporations. 44
D. CRITICS OF IP BOX REGIMES
Critics have referred to intellectual property boxes as '"a race to the bottom'
in capital taxation." 45 Largely because they lead to "harmful tax competition
between countries." 46 Also, critics point out that these systems put significant
emphasis on a relatively small subset of businesses that hold intellectual property,
when these tax reductions could be more beneficial if dispersed throughout the
economy.47 Intellectual property boxes were first introduced in Ireland and
France in the 1970s. 48 But since their introduction to the national stage, few
38 Evers, Miller & Spengel, supra note 27, at 503.
39 Id. at 505.
40 Id.
41 REPUBLICAN STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 114TH CONG., PATENT BoxEs: A BRIEF
HISTORY, RECENT DEVELOPMENT, AND NECESSARY CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 10, 2016),
https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/02a2al8a-1e08-42ce-8cl4-
72b6138b54dd/031016-patent-boxes.pdf (hereinafter Patent Box Reporl)
42 Evers, Miller & Spengel , supra note 27, at 504; GRAVELLE, supra note 32 ("[Ihe term
'box' refers to checking a box on the tax return.").
43 BYRNES, supra note 18 5 17.01 ("[I]ntangible assets such as patents... can have a
substantial bearing on a company's value and, subsequently, they can affect the entire economy
of the relevant community where the company is located.").
44 Id. Many countries have additionally used tax incentives such as tax credits for research
and development costs. The influence of this incentive is excluded from this Note's analysis
of 26 U.S.C. 5 1221.
45 Id (citing ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND
PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAx PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5 - 2014 FINAL REPORT 1,
9 (2014).
46 Id. (citing Rafael Sanz-G6mez, The OECD's NexusApproach to IP Boxes: A European Union
Law Perspective, WU INT' TAX'N RES. PAPER SERIES 1, 3 (2015))
47 Patent Box Report, supra note 41. f
48 See BYRNES, supra note 18 5 17.03 (citing A. Alstadseter, et. al., Patent Boxes Design, Patents
Location andLocalR'D 22 (IPTS Working Papers on Corp. R&D and Innovation No. 6/2015,
2015).
335
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scholars have researched the effectiveness in boosting the country that adopted
them.49 One study found that companies operating in a country that had an
intellectual property box issued more patents than countries without, but the
resulting tax erosion in tax revenue did not appear to offset the increased income
from patent applications, "at least in the short term."50 This trade-off further
demonstrates the inherent tension with the TCJA's revisions to 26 U.S.C. 51221,
decrease tax revenue or encourage innovation (or at least "geographical location"
of a creator's intellectual property).
E. CONGRESS'S INTENT TO REVISE 26 U.S.C. 1221 IS SIMILAR TO THE
MOTIVATIONS OF TAX BOXES
Congress' revision of 5l221(a)(3) was intended to have similar effects as
intellectual property boxes created by other countries-to incentivize firms to
hold intellectual property in their country."51 It is unclear whether the TCJA's
approach will have similar effects in the United States. Given the overlapping
incentives and reduced tax liabilities of intellectual property tax boxes and the
revised § 1221 (a)(3), the consequences of these boxes on patent holdings can be
a case study and comparison for the potential effects of the new intellectual
property categorization.
F. TAX BOX POPULARITY IN UNITED STATES?
There are three primary reasons jurisdictions adopt intellectual property
boxes: to incentivize innovation, attract mobile Intellectual Property assets, and
efficiently raise tax revenue. 52 These incentives have enticed United States
Legislators to incorporate an intellectual property box into our tax code. 5
3 In
2013, a member of Congress proposed an intellectual property box regime to be
adopted in the Internal Revenue Code. 4 Generally, this type of regime provides
tax relief for income related to any form of revenue generated from intellectual
property.55 The introduction of a U.S. intellectual property box gained bipartisan
support in 2015 to combat the poaching of United States companies' intellectual
property into other nations. 5
6
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Sam Schechner, Tax Change Aims to Lure Intellectual Property Back to the U.S.
(Jan. 24, 2018), https:/ /www.wsj.com/articles/companies-explore-whether-u-s-can-replace-
double- irish-1516789801
52 BYRNES, supra note 18 5 17.04.
53 Id.
54 Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013, H.R. 2605, 113"' Cong. (2013).
55 Id.
56 Peter Merrill, Innovation Boxes: Beps and Beyond, National Tax journal, December 2016, 69
(4) 1.
[Vol. 26:2336
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An intellectual property box could provide for greater tax relief than the
recent revision of 26 U.S.C. 5 1221 because the language of the proposed
intellectual property box would have generally applied to any "taxpayer" of
intellectual property, meaning individuals and corporations.57 But proposals in
2015 would have only would have Tax Boxes be applicable to corporations.
Therefore the benefits would not be available to individuals. However, this
proposal was not adopted. In fact, the current U.S. Tax Code "make[s] is
unprofitable for U.S. companies to use IP Boxes of foreign jurisdiction" by
imposing a significant tax when a U.S. company attempts to transfer its
intellectual property assets to its parent company from a foreign subsidiary."58
With the discussion of corporate tax reform movement of 2017, the idea of
a U.S. intellectual property box regime resurfaced.59 Historically, the United
States has offered significant tax incentives for innovation, with full deduction
of research and development costs to corporations and individuals. 60 The Joint
Economic Committee noted that innovation is inherently linked to the economy,
which makes "the economic pie bigger for everyone." 61
G. STABILITY OF THE TCJA REVISIONS
The long-term effects of this policy change are uncertain for many reasons..
There is a possibility that a political shift will result in reversal. 62 It is unlikely
"'any firm would be well served by betting the ranch on the stability of the new
tax law,' said Edward Kleinbard, a former U.S. tax official who is now a tax
professor at the University of Southern California law school." 63 Because of the
uncertainty in whether this tax policy will last, the true effects and incentives
created by the new characterization of intellectual property assets may be
unknown for years to come.
Excluding the proceeds from the sale of patents and inventions will have
significant impacts on individual creators. The capital asset categorization prior
to the passage of TJCA ranged from 15-20%, depending on the individual's
income. 64 Under the TCJA, the proceeds of an individual's sale of intellectual
property will be subject to respective individual income tax rates, ranging from
57 Id.
58 BYRNES, supra note 19 5 17.04.
59 Id. (citing Patent Box Report, supra note 41).
60 Patent Box Report, supra note 44.
61 Id.
62 Rosen, supra, note 6.
63 Schechner, supra note 12.
64 Maurie Backman, The Capital Gains Tax Rate: Whatyou Need to Knowfor 2017, THE MOTLEY
FOOL (Dec. 16, 2016, 8:41 AM), https: //www. fool.com/retirement/2016/12/16/capital-
gains-tax-rate-for-2017.aspx (Individual single tax filer making $37,500-$112,500 paid 15%
on capitals gains profits. Individual single tax filers making $112,500 and above paid 20% on
capital gains profits).
337
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22%-38.5%.65 The tax impact for individuals will likely vary dramatically
depending on the specific individual's income. Whether this reduction in profit
is significant enough to decrease incentives to innovate is uncertain.
III. ANALYSIS
The revision of the tax code creates two primary issues. First, the revisions
penalize non-corporate holders of patents and inventions. Second, the revision
is unlikely to achieve its intended goal of keeping intellectual property assets in
the United States.
A. THE TCJA'S REVISIONS TO 51221 PENALIZE NON-CORPORATE PATENT
HOLDERS
The TCJA hurts non-corporate patent holders because these are the only
taxpayers whose tax rates are affected by the new revisions. Though the change
may not necessarily disincentivize individual inventors, it provides less financial
reward than to corporate patent holders. Whether or not the change decreases
research and development of patentable ideas and inventions, it still will serve as
financial penalty that individuals will face and the corporations will not. The
influence this revision will have on behavior is uncertain, and may be minimal
and insignificant. However, the financial consequence will occur regardless of
whether it changes inventive behavior. This result is not "right or wrong," but it
is a policy choice that the United States must realize it is choosing. This
consequence is not inevitable.
This revision is in line with the general trend of tax law and intellectual
property law favoring corporations over individuals. But to protect corporate
interests and remain competitive in the market to be the geographical home for
corporations and their intellectual property, U.S. policies do not have to penalize
non-corporate patent holders and inventors.
B. THE REVISIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO MOTIVATE CORPORATIONS TO RETAIN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSET TAXABLE INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES
The effects of TCJA have limited real financial incentives for corporations to
hold the intellectual property in the United States because the effects of the
provisions combined with the new corporate tax rate will almost cancel each
other out while only penalizing non-corporate tax payers. There are alternatives
65 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, supra note 9 at 10.
For comparison, individuals making $38,700-$70,00 are in the 22% bracket; $70,000-$160,00
are in the 24% bracket; $160,000-$200,000 are in the 32% bracket; $200,000-$500,000 are in
the 35% bracket; over $500,000 are in the 38.5% bracket.
[Vol. 26:2338
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to the current characterization of intellectual property under the TCJA that could
accomplish more of Congress' intended goals.
The United States could implement an intellectual property tax box that was
comparable to other countries. The box should be available to any profit
resulting from intellectual property, regardless of the entity that holds or created
the property. Although at first glance this type of policy seems to create a huge
tax cut to intellectual property income, the tax box rate could be set in the range
comparable to capital gains rates. To make the United States tax policy more
competitive, rates would not need to be as low as other countries for multiple
reasons.
The United States can entice companies to hold intellectual property in the
United States with only a slight reduction in taxes because the United States
patents have stronger and broader intellectual property protections than many
countries. Stronger protections can level the playing field if the tax rate is at least
low enough that the costs saved offset the costs of the tax.
The tax rates would also not need to be as low as other countries because
there are financial and practical benefits of a company holding its intellectual
property rights in its country of primary business. So long as the tax rate is set
below the transaction costs for holding intellectual property rights in a foreign
country, corporations will have incentive to keep and maintain their intellectual
property in the United States. The ease of location combined with a competitive
tax rate will be sufficient to entice firms to maintain their intellectual property in
the United States.
Implementing an intellectual property box may also demonstrate more
stability in the tax treatment of intellectual property than the current version of
5 1221. The TCJA is full of contradictory treatment of intellectual property
rights, which create haste for individuals to plan their tax behavior around the
current code. Also, the legitimate concerns with stability and polarization of the
current political climate in the United States causes some firms to hesitate when
considering whether to subject their finances to that instability. Creating an
intellectual property tax box may demonstrate a clear and unequivocal
commitment to tax treatment of intellectual property tax assets. A demonstration
of stability will not only entice intellectual property to be held in the United
States, but also will create incentives for firms to keep it the United States.
Creating a intellectual property box will also help the United States tax policy
achieve another goal-to raise revenue. The point of tax is not only to incentivize
invention, but also to increase the size of the tax base. Although intellectual
property box reduces the magnitude of taxes paid per patent, it will also entice
more companies to maintain their intellectual property in the United States,
increasing the size of the tax base. This is a policy change that can encourage
innovation, encourage intellectual property to be held in the United States, while
not reducing the net tax revenue.
339
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An intellectual property box also provides a simplification 6 U.S.C. 5 1221 of
the tax code. Simply applying the same lower rate to all income related to
intellectual property is efficient.
An intellectual property box would bring the goals of income tax in line with
the goals of protecting intellectual property. The current system entices
corporations to hold their intellectual property in foreign countries, and
therefore encourages and creates financial incentive to redirect intellectual
property to foreign countries. By getting rid of this incentive to flee and
encouraging the holding of intellectual property in the United States, an
intellectual property box would make it more likely that more firms are being
taxed on their true income from intellectual property. This is potentially what the
revision to § 1221 was aimed at doing since it will treat the fruits of labor in
developing patents as income, rather than some sort of asset acquisition.
However, the competition created by other countries that provide lower tax rates
to lure intellectual property prevents the current code from solving the issue of
accurately reflecting the true income from patents because of the diversionary
effect that keeps intellectual property assets from being located and taxed in the
United States.
An intellectual property box would also be in line with the underlying
principles of protecting intellectual property rights. An intellectual property box
would incentivize innovation because the financial reward of developing a
patentable invention would be significant. Additionally, it would allow a patent
holder to have a monopoly in the market for a limited period of time. This
monopoly provides an economic incentive to tip the scale of research and
development investment toward innovation.
If an intellectual property box is politically not feasible, an alternative would
be to amend the current statutes as soon as possible to allow firms and
individuals to appropriately plan their tax behavior. Additionally, another option
would be returning 5 1221 to its previous form. Although a return to the old 5
1221 would not solve the issue of the current "international tax competition," it
would at least remove the tax penalty now imposed on non-corporate patent
creators.
V. CONCLUSION
The effects of TCJA's revision of 26 U.S.C. 5 1221 are uncertain. The legal
effect of the multiple contradictions regarding intellectual property income in the
code are uncertain. The stability of this policy for years to come is uncertain.
With uncertainty around every corner, the true effect this policy has on tax
planning is difficult to predict. The instability could result in no change in current
behavior and innovation and patent location would remain at the status quo.
Regardless, there are options that would lead to better results for all parties
involved than the outcomes under the current code.
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